It is useful to make it clear what this argument against atheism is not  ( this brief piece serves as an Addendum to a larger rhetorical experiment here).  This is not an argument for the existence of any particular deity, or deities generally.  This is not, in general, an argument that anything specific exists that is not generally accepted, or proven by empirical science.

There is no claim that any sort of enduring afterlife awaits us as we leave the mortal coil. There is no claim that particular people have acted as conduits for messages from gods to Earth – as prophets for gods.  There is no claim that miracles have been performed, signs have been left, people resurrected, that a judgement day’s a comin’. There is no claim that the evidence for evolution should be disregarded because the cosmos was instead created at some time in the last few thousand years.

In general terms, this  is not an argument designed to engender belief in deities. As the author of this piece, I can attest that having had an entirely secular upbringing,  I have since embraced no faith.  All evidence of perception and experience have indicated to me that there is very likely no god.   All this said I have not yet heard an entirely watertight argument in favour of atheism.  The theory that might support the personal experience seems weak.

Partly this is worth stating because it should be made clear that making a case for atheism by mounting an argument against religious dogma will not serve to refute the one put here. This is not a defence of Creationism, Intelligent Design, or the existence of Heaven and Hell, or any particular god at all. It is a defence of the idea that agnosticism is the stronger position to take in relation to the existence of god/s, given the limits of what we know.

The next step in making clear what this argument isn’t is trickier.  I want to make it clear that certain off-the-shelf notions of God or deities are not being endorsed.  It should really be clear from the main body of the argument against atheism: the position defended here is one of agnosticism and general uncertainty, not a defence of the existence of gods in general.  The most that is being conceded is the possibility that something that perhaps should or could be described as a deity of some sort may exist somewhere.  But spelling out what kinds of God claims are not being made about is useful for two reasons.  Firstly it distinguishes this argument from those that are based on assertions that God necessarily exists.  Second, it again demonstrates that this argument against atheism is unaffected by any that aims to discredit specific, and often misapprehended conceptions of God.

Here, then, are some conceptions of God that are not being defended here (or possibly by anyone):

No claim is being made for the existence of ‘God-with-a-beard’ (the cheap construction of the Christian God that can be visualised in a Pythonesque way, or comes to mind when the sun breaking through the clouds has a religious connotation reminiscent of cheesy credits of Sunday morning TV programmes or even cheesier late night advertisements for God).

No claim is being made here for a Stern Creator along the lines of Jehovah, Old School.  This conception of God appears a terrifying sentience – an individual – distinct from the universe, with vast inexplicable powers over mortals’ Earth and a penchant for smiting those who do not turn to worship adroitly.  There is the suggestion at the beginning of the Old Testament of other gods from the same region as Jehovah – this suggests local origins despite eventual universal reach.

No claim is being made here for a  god of Love either – by which I mean the kind of deity Aristotle and Plato called God.  The Christian God of the modern era looks to an agnostic philosopher like an amalgam of Jehovah and neo-Platonic abstractions, ideal forms existing on another plane.  The highest of these forms, according to the ancient philosophy, is Love.  This ubiquious, benevolent force seems to infuse an idea of God prevalent today: it’s the idea, in any case, I was slightly exposed to during childhood.

I could go on listing – or constructing – gods that claims are not being made about.  No claim is being made that there is a deity in every tree, that Hermes is flitting about the skies, that Poseidon is somewhere under the waves.  But it should be clear by this point that there’s a problem with these gods as defined.  The problem is, really, that the definitions lack conviction.  Because I don’t believe in the existence of the deities in question, I can’t put out a description of them that would make sense to the people who do believe.  My definitions of Gods are secular ones: I cannot be sure any definition I provide would be adequate for someone who accepts that the god in question exists.

This may well be a problem widespread in argument about the existence of deities:  it is very difficult for two people engaged in conversation about a deity that just one of them believes in to be sure they are talking about the same thing.   In this case it may be necessary to concede that justice can’t be done to the idea of a God who necessarily exists unless one believes She necessarily exists.

All this is grounded in the further assumption that God is explicable.  It may also be reasonable to consider that any actual God defies the sort of description that can be included in an argument like this.

It should be clear that I have only a vague idea about what it is I don’t believe in, and that this is the source of any doubt about disbelief.  It isn’t that I want to argue from here that doubt about strict disbelief in god should lead to belief.  It shouldn’t.  But I don’t expect that I can go about imagining all the ways that other people conceive of God, or gaining access to all of the required concepts and connotations.  Some of these conceptions may be simple – easy to grasp.  But others I know to be complex edifices of belief and understanding, that defy respectful treatment with a quick and ready definition.

The principle reason for following this line of thinking is to put this proposition: how can unwavering belief in the non-existence of gods be maintained without first considering – with a degree of imagination –  all of the ways that gods might be?  In my own case I’m ready to say that I can only realistically refute things that I’ve considered.  And for a number of reasons, I haven’t thought about all the ways that God or gods might be.

As stated, this might be because I’m not equipped to have the right sort of experience of the world to properly apprehend God (assuming Her existence). It might be because I don’t have the education or cultural background to conceive of gods or God in a proper light.

Far more persuasive than either of these two possibilities, from my point of view, is consideration of all the deities, religions, faiths and pantheons I haven’t heard of at all, or only in passing.  Those that I can only encounter indirectly due to the barriers of language (all of them, really).  A refutation of Christianity does not count as a refutation of all the religious thought that’s been done.

Until some sort of comprehensive stab has been taken at thinking about all the sorts of deities that might exist, a definitive assertion that there is no such thing as any god, anywhere seems weak. The Argument Against Atheism, then, from Doubt about Disbelief is that it is not possible to refute something with complete confidence without knowing specifically what is being refuted. A kind of doubt should be conceded about the claim that something does not exist  if there is ambiguity about what it is that is doing the non-existing.