The Argument from Possibility

When contemplating the general question as to the existence of a deity, is is usual to consider necessary deities first and foremost, and sometimes exclusively.  In a culture dominated by monotheistic religion this is reasonable.  The first deity that usually comes to mind is an absolute and necessary God, lord of all Creation.  If this God is ubiquitous and ever-present, stitched into the fabric of existence, we shouldn’t have to go far to disprove it.  With respect to this deity of absolute presence and power, a reasonable argument for non-existence can be made if it can be shown that any part of reality functions smoothly without any evidence of the hand of God.  If no god is required for things to operate, then perhaps  it should be considered likely that there is none.  This argument accords with the demands of parsimony, keeping the Cosmos simple.

Of course, this argument only works if God works in mysterious ways: via miracle, and so on.  If God works in mundane ways then She may not show Her hand at all, having set physical processes running in such a way as to make them to all intents and purposes independent.  In other words, if some divine engine of the universe is running, but everything it does has a natural cosmic machinery equivalent, then the existence of a universe saturated with God may be falsely refuted.

If atheism is the view that there is definitely no god, it should go further than refuting the existence of this particular deity.   A strict atheist argument should, I think, defend the logical position that god (or gods) do not exist even possibly.

Consider a pantheon of gods of the sort once thought to populate the Hellenic world. Like ministers in a democratic government these gods have portfolios – areas of influence.  Some control or represent elemental forces.  Others have social portfolios, dealing in human emotions or areas of civil life. They live, like the Greek gods, in a nearby palatial dimension, or atop a mountain somewhere.   They are irascible, petulant, capricious corrupted by great power.  The mortals who live under their sway are sometimes grateful for their influence but never quite able to relax.

In considering the question of atheism it is not only necessary to refute the existence of God Almighty, Yahweh, but also the Greek pantheon.  How easily can we make the argument that the Greek gods (or the Norse gods, or the Egyptian gods) did not exist?

One approach that comes to mind is to ask what happened to them, if they did exist.  The story of their departure from the Earth is not part of the mythology.  What of other ancient Gods – Mithras, for example, or Thoth.  In general, if they had existed, one might assume they are still here.  And these Gods were far from mysterious in their conduct: their presence was widely felt.  When you lived in the vicinity or on the stamping grounds of Zeus or Thor you knew about it, if the stories are accurate. 

Even from this thin argument the existence of the Ancient gods might be refuted.  If these gods existed at this world, so recently in history as three or four thousand years ago, the evidence should be more substantial that they were here.  If they departed, why is this not part of the mythology? 

This argument is against atheism, not against pagan belief.  The point of interest here is not whether arguments can be found to refute the existence of gods, but whether any proposition can be put asserting the existence of deities that cannot be adequately refuted.  

So far deities canvassed in this part of the argument are Necessary (God) or at the least Actual gods (in the case of Greek or Norse gods in the sense that they either existed – Actually, in history – or they did not.  Some propositions, though, concern possible rather than actual deities.  And this leads to questions as to whether an atheist must  reject  any statement that is not strict  negation where the existence of god/s is concerned.

Looking at the question as to whether the Greek gods existed in history is entirely different from examining the possibility that they exist.  But the atheist, I think, is bound to refute both of the following statements:

The Greek gods existed in history and intervened in mortal affairs.

A pantheon of powerful gods possibly exist and may intervene in mortal affairs.

The first statement, as indicated, is relatively easily refuted.  The second statement at least requires a different calibre of refutation.  Looked at in a quantitative way, asserting the possible existence of gods means asserting their existence at some world.  If logical space contains all possible states of affairs as worlds then to refute the existence of a God or gods means arguing that such a state of affairs is impossible.  It is not important whether there is evidence locally concerning the existence of a deity hereabouts.  The question here is whether a world with gods can be imagined which is otherwise consistent with ways that worlds might be.

One approach to examining the possibility of the existence of gods is to look at the notion of supernatural power.  Fundamental laws of physics, we might say, must be true at all worlds.  The powers of the gods must be explicable in terms of these laws, or else they exist at no world.  

This argument is dependent on setting minimal conditions as to what a world is.  Fundamental laws of physics as we have them may not be considered necessary.  Perhaps only mathematical axioms are constant across all of possibility. Perhaps not even mathematics is consistent at all possible worlds.

A state of affairs is impossible if it does not satisfy minimum or necessary conditions for worlds, or if it is contradictory.  If there is any possible, non-contradictory state of affairs of which a god or gods are a part, this contradicts the essential atheist claim that ‘there is no god’.

Possible worlds theory can be employed as a tool for looking beyond Actual or local gods in making claims about what may or may not exist.  Is the committed atheist required to refute the existence even of possible gods – gods at other worlds, in all possible states of affairs?  One reason that this is difficult is that people do not share a common set of minimum conditions for worlds.   

A second reason that it is difficult to be clear on whether gods possibly exist (at some world) is that opening speculation up to all sorts of different possible worlds opens up speculation on what constitutes a god.  Is a being a deity relative to beings it creates or lords it over?   What absolute criteria for divinity prevent such an easy application of the label ‘god’?

But this is properly the subject of the next part of this argument, ‘The argument from high technology’  to be posted in coming days.

Worth noting that possible worlds theory presents some interesting questions for theists as well as atheists.  If it is believed that there is an all-powerful, Necessary God, then by implication that God is everywhere, and at all worlds.  There cannot be a world without God.  This means that even the possibility of God’s non-existence cannot be conceded, and this seems odd.  A powerful line of thought, though, for theists.  The problem is in an adjunct question:  does the necessary and absolute God exist at all worlds at once, or is there a necessary and absolute God for each (given that possible worlds are supposedly causally independent).  Plantinga a good read on questions such as these.